Case 01 · Face swap
One person's face on another person's head.
What a human reviewer might notice: a seam at the hairline and the jaw, and a face thirty years older than the hair.
Drag the handle to compare
This person wants to open an account.
He isn't real. He's a deepfake. The PXL Deepfake Detector catches him at onboarding.
This person does not exist.
Synthetic Face98.7 % confidenceFlagged by the PXL Deepfake Detector
Not too long ago this took a skilled operator and a workstation. Today it takes a phone and a subscription.
PXL Deepfake Detector
A trained human reviewer can sometimes spot basic Deepfakes. Our Deepfake Detector sees far more than a human and also catches the attacks with no visible tell at all.
Customers who trust PXL Vision
The record
Built to generalise to generators it was never trained on, which matters when a new tool launches every month.
New generators are added continuously. Detection is an arms race and the cadence is the weapon.
Built in collaboration with Idiap Research Institute on peer-reviewed biometric research, not on a scraped media corpus.
ETSI TS 119 461 and CEN/TS 18099, the standards your auditors will be asking about.
One switch for existing customers. REST API or SDK for everyone else. Flagged cases can route to manual review.
Processed and stored in data centres in Switzerland and the EU, under Swiss data protection law and the GDPR. What is kept, and for how long, is set in your data processing agreement.
Four fictional persons, four real manipulations. Made in an afternoon with tools anyone can subscribe to.
Four ways a face can lie.
01 / 04
Case 01 · Face swap
What a human reviewer might notice: a seam at the hairline and the jaw, and a face thirty years older than the hair.
Drag the handle to compare
Case 02 · Face synthesis
What a human reviewer might notice: mirror symmetry, skin without a single pore, a smile too even to be a smile.
Move over the face to magnify
Case 03 · Face editing
What a human reviewer might notice: texture that changes around the eyes and the mouth, and nowhere else.
Scroll to age the face
Case 04 · Face reenactment
What a human reviewer might notice: a mouth and eyes that move out of sync with the head.
Verify your identity
CapturingChecking for deepfakesSynthetic
PXL Deepfake Detector at work
The user takes a selfie as usual. The verdict arrives with the confidence and the suspected manipulation type, before the damage happens.
An onboarding selfie is a controlled scene: one face, camera-facing, front-lit, captured live. General-purpose media detectors are built for anything, so they drift on this job. The PXL Deepfake Detector is tuned for that one scene.
It reads the captured image itself, so it makes no difference whether a manipulated face arrived through the phone camera, a virtual camera or an injected stream. Injection attack detection runs as its own layer in PXL Ident. And it checks the selfie, not the portrait printed on the document: morphing attacks on document photos are a separate check.
Where it fitsProblemA synthetic identity arrives as a plausible document and a face reenacted or generated to match it. A real person sits in front of the camera, so liveness passes.
DamageAn account that belongs to no real customer. It turns into a mule account, draws credit that is never repaid and leaves a KYC file the regulator can pick apart.
SolutionThe detector checks the selfie frame inside the onboarding flow, next to liveness and document verification, and a synthetic verdict blocks or routes the case before the account exists. For EU providers this is the step that eIDAS 2.0 and ETSI TS 119 461 expect remote identity proofing to defend.
ProblemA stolen or bought document paired with a swapped face is enough to activate, replace or port a SIM.
DamageThe SIM is the doorway to one-time codes for banking and email. One fraudulent activation turns into account takeovers elsewhere, and the telco carries the disputes and the financed handset that is never paid off.
SolutionThe detector checks the selfie at activation, replacement and porting. Telcos on PXL Ident switch it on without integration work.
ProblemAccount takeover increasingly starts with a reenacted face, driven from a profile photo or a scraped video, presented at a step-up check: a password reset, a new device, a large transfer.
DamageAn account that passed every check at onboarding is emptied under the genuine customer's name, and the dispute lands on your desk.
SolutionThe detector asks whether the face in front of the camera has been manipulated at all. Face matching only asks whether it is the same person. Together they close the gap either one leaves open.
ProblemMarketplaces, gig platforms and dating apps meet synthetic faces at scale: profiles built around a person who never existed.
DamageReal users get scammed by accounts that carry your verified badge, and a ring can run hundreds of them before anyone notices.
SolutionThe detector runs at profile verification and again on a schedule. A face later found in a ring can be traced to every account it fronted.
ProblemImpostor employees pass remote identity checks with a candidate's selfie swapped to match a purchased identity.
DamageSomeone you never vetted holds a company laptop and access to payroll and customer data from day one.
SolutionA deepfake check at the pre-employment identity step, before background checks are ordered, keeps the manipulated face from ever entering the record.
ProblemInsurers see aged or edited faces reused across policies, and synthetic policyholders who exist only as a document and a face.
DamageClaims paid to people who do not exist and policies written on invented lives, in a book of business you cannot trust when the audit comes.
SolutionWhere a claim or a policy change carries a selfie step, the detector flags the manipulated ones and routes them to manual review instead of straight-through processing.
ProblemFraud rings reuse the same synthetic face under new names, and each account passed onboarding on its own.
DamageA ring keeps operating across dozens of accounts, each one legitimate in isolation, until the losses are added up.
SolutionRunning the detector over stored selfies of high-risk accounts surfaces the repeats. Through the PXL Fraud Protection Network the pattern can be shared across providers before the next onboarding flow is hit.
Synthetic, face reenactment
Synthetic, face swap
Synthetic, face editing
Synthetic, face synthesis
Synthetic, face swap
Synthetic, face editing
Synthetic, face swap
A face image or selfie from an onboarding or monitoring step. It returns a verdict, a confidence score, the manipulation type (face swap, face synthesis, face editing or face reenactment) and, in beta, the family of generator most likely behind it. It checks the selfie, not the portrait printed on the document.
No. It is one layer in the verification flow. It works next to liveness, presentation attack detection and injection attack detection, document verification and NFC chip reading, and it is native to PXL Ident.
Every verdict comes with a confidence score, and the operating point is part of the model release, so there is no threshold for you to tune. A result the detector is not confident about does not have to end the transaction: it can go to manual review, for example PXL Check, instead of a hard block.
It is tuned for the range of conditions seen in real onboarding flows. A poor capture lowers the confidence rather than forcing a verdict, and most flows ask the person for a retake.
In Switzerland and the EU, under Swiss data protection law and the GDPR. What is kept, for how long, and whether it may be used to improve the detector is set in your data processing agreement. How PXL Vision handles personal data in general is described in the privacy policy.
Yes. There is a REST API for any stack and an SDK. PXL Ident customers switch it on without any integration work.
The model is retrained continuously and released on a cadence, and it is built to generalise to generation methods it has not seen. More than 60 generation tools are covered today.
Not yet. Presentation attack detection has a certification standard, ISO/IEC 30107-3, and injection attack detection has CEN/TS 18099, with ISO/IEC 25456 in draft. For deepfake detection itself no standard or certification scheme exists, as the 2026 market report by Biometric Update and Goode Intelligence records. That is why we publish how we measure.
No. Every face on this site is an AI-generated fictional person. No real individual is depicted.
PXL Deepfake Detector, integration and access
Send the selfie, get the verdict, the confidence and the manipulation type. Nothing to train, no threshold to tune.
Three ways to wire it in
POST /v1/deepfake/analyze
image: selfie.jpg
{ "verdict": "synthetic", "confidence": 0.987,
"manipulation": "face_swap",
"generator_family": "diffusion_face_swap" } // beta